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R v Khawaja and the Fraught 
Question of Rehabilitation in 
Terrorism Sentencing
Robert Diab*
In R v Khawaja, Supreme Court of Canada addressed the question of how courts should 
handle the sentencing of terrorism offenders. Although it affirmed the Ontario Court of Appeal’s 
decision to raise the sentence imposed by the trial judge, the Supreme Court took a different 
approach to the importance of rehabilitation as a goal in terrorism sentencing generally. The 
Court of Appeal found that because of terrorism’s unique and serious nature, there should be 
very little consideration of the possibility of rehabilitation. The Supreme Court disagreed, ruling 
that the weight to be placed on rehabilitation in such cases should be left to trial judges and that, 
depending on the facts, rehabilitation could be a significant factor even in the context of very 
serious terror offences.
The author reviews the history of R v Khawaja, contrasting the Supreme Court’s decision 
with the approach of the Ontario Court of Appeal both in Khawaja and in a number of other cases. 
He reviews the British and Australian jurisprudence drawn on by the Court of Appeal, which 
looks on terrorism as a distinct type of crime that calls only for an emphasis on deterrence and 
punishment in sentencing, and argues that the Supreme Court’s decision indicates a significantly 
different attitude to the issue. Khawaja allows for rehabilitation to potentially factor into the 
sentencing of terrorism offenders. The author further considers this decision though the lens 
Antony Duff’s theory of punishment, which suggests that the concepts of moral agency, equality 
and the possibility of individual redemption are foundational to a sense of political community. 
He argues that the Supreme Court’s decision constitutes an implicit affirmation of Duff’s view 
on the importance of the goal of rehabilitation even for the worst offenders.
*  Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, Thompson Rivers University. The author would 
like to thank the anonymous referees for their helpful comments and recommendations. 
(2014) 39:2 Queen’s LJ2 R. Diab 3
Introduction
I. Context of the Supreme Court’s Decision in Khawaja
A. A Brief Note on Rehabilitation in Canadian Sentencing Law
B. The Trial Decision in Khawaja (Ontario Superior Court) 
C. The Court of Appeal Decision 
D. The Court of Appeal’s Development of Earlier UK and Australian Approaches
II. The Supreme Court Decision and Its Break from Earlier Approaches
III. A Duffian Reading of Khawaja and Its Broader Implications
Conclusion
Introduction
Courts in recent years have grappled with the role that rehabilitation 
should play in sentencing an offender for involvement in terrorism. Until 
now the question has been confined to the case law, garnering little public 
notice or debate. But recent events suggest that it may become a matter of 
wider concern. Parliament has created the new offence of attempting to 
leave Canada to join a terror group abroad, thus criminalizing conduct at 
earlier stages of terror-related activity.1 Police have also charged suspects 
with conspiracy to bomb a VIA Rail train in the Laurentian corridor, 
stopping a terrorism plot at a very early stage.2 Other terror-related 
prosecutions are pending. Therefore courts may soon confront the task of 
sentencing offenders with lesser culpability than those who have played 
a central role in more developed plots. The question in these cases—for 
the court and for a wider public—will be whether and to what degree 
the objective of rehabilitation should play a role in sentencing, alongside 
denunciation, deterrence and incapacitation.
These events and the questions to which they give rise also lend a 
certain timeliness to the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent decision in 
R v Khawaja.3 One of the central issues in the sentencing appeal portion 
of this case was what role rehabilitation should play in the sentencing of 
terrorism offenders generally, and whether it might play an important 
role in more serious cases in particular. The Court’s holding on these 
issues marks a clear break with prevailing approaches to terror sentencing 
1.  Combating Terrorism Act, SC 2013, c 9, ss 6–8.
2.  Tu Thanh Ha, Colin Freeze & Daniel Leblanc, “RCMP Arrest Two for ‘al-Qaeda-
supported’ Plot to Bomb Via Train”, The Globe and Mail (22 April 2013) online: The Globe 
and Mail <www.theglobeandmail.com>.
3.  2012 SCC 69, [2012] 3 SCR 555 [Khawaja (SCC)].
in earlier jurisprudence in Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia. It 
also sets out a uniquely affirmative position on the role of rehabilitation 
in this context.
The nature of the Court’s break with earlier case law is best understood 
in light of the framework for terrorism sentencing put in place after 
September 11, 2001, and the jurisprudence arising within it. In response to 
9/11, the United Nations called upon member states to pass new criminal 
laws to counter terrorism, including laws requiring stiffer sentences.4 
Canada responded in short order by passing the Anti-Terrorism Act, which 
did not impose any particular mandatory minimum penalties but did 
mandate consecutive sentences for multiple offences and the possibility 
of life imprisonment for many offences.5 Many other nations also passed 
new and stiffer anti-terrorism laws.6 By the end of the decade, courts in 
Canada, the UK, Australia and other Commonwealth jurisdictions had 
developed a jurisprudence on terrorism sentencing in cases ranging from 
principal figures in very serious plots to peripheral figures with minor 
or tangential roles.7 Despite the range of conduct involved, a consensus 
had emerged from the cases: terrorism offences were a special category of 
4.  Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, SC Res 1373, UNSCOR, 
2001, S/RES/1373.
5.  SC 2001, c 41. For context on the passage of the Act, see Kent Roach, September 11: 
Consequences for Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003) [Roach, 
September 11]. For an overview of the sentencing provisions in the Anti-terrorism Act 
and early jurisprudence, see Robert Diab, “Sentencing of Terrorism Offences after 9/11: 
A Comparative Review of Early Case Law” in Craig Forcese & François Crépeau, eds, 
Terrorism, Law and Democracy: 10 Years After 9/11 (Montreal: Canadian Institute for the 
Administration of Justice, 2011).
6.  Kent Roach, The 9/11 Effect: Comparative Counter-Terrorism (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011).
7.  For Canadian cases, see R v Khawaja (2009), 248 CCC (3d) 233 (available on WL Can) 
(Ont Sup Ct) [Khawaja (Ont Sup Ct)], aff’d 2010 ONCA 862, 103 OR (3d) 321, [Khawaja 
(Ont CA)]; R v Khalid, 2009 CarswellOnt 9874 (WL Can) (Ont Sup Ct), var’d 2010 ONCA 
861, 103 OR (3d) 600 [Khalid (Ont CA)]; R v Amara, 2010 ONSC 441 (available on WL 
Can), aff’d 2010 ONCA 858, 266 CCC (3d) 422 [Amara (Ont CA)]; R v Gaya, 2010 ONSC 
434, 255 CCC (3d) 419 [Gaya (Ont Sup Ct)] var’d 2010 ONCA 860, 266 CCC (3d) 428 
[Gaya (Ont CA)]; R v Dirie, 2009 CanLII 58598 (Ont Sup Ct); and R v Ahmad, 2010 ONSC 
5874.
For cases from the United Kingdom, see R v Barot [2007] EWCA Crim 1119; R v Ibrahim 
[2008] EWCA Crim 880; R v Sherif, [2008] EWCA Crim 2653; and R v Khyam [2008] 
EWCA Crim 1612.
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crime and called for a primary, if not exclusive, emphasis on denunciation, 
deterrence and incapacitation. A number of courts had also held that 
terrorism offences by their very nature precluded, or at least called into 
question, the notion that rehabilitation should play more than a minimal 
role in sentencing.
A crucial development in this body of case law was a set of Ontario 
Court of Appeal decisions in the companion cases of Khawaja, Khalid, 
Gaya, and Amara in 2010.8 That court followed the path taken by 
appeal courts in the UK and Australia by emphasizing denunciation and 
asserting a minimal role for rehabilitation.9 But while British courts had 
held that rehabilitation was to play “little or no role” in the more serious 
terrorism cases, the Ontario Court of Appeal sided with Australian courts 
in embracing the proposition that rehabilitation should play only a minor 
role in any terrorism case.10 In its decision in R v Khawaja,11 the Supreme 
Court of Canada marked a break with both of these approaches. While 
upholding the lower court’s decision to raise Khawaja’s sentence because 
of the seriousness of his conduct, the Supreme Court rejected the Ontario 
Court of Appeal’s categorical de-emphasis on rehabilitation in sentencing 
for terrorism offences generally. Yet it also declined to affirm the more 
restricted principle from British case law that rehabilitation should play a 
lesser role in at least the more serious cases.
However, the Supreme Court’s rationale for this unique approach 
remains unclear. In effect, the Court held that terror offences do not fall 
within a special category of crime, nor should rehabilitation be minimized 
in every terrorism case, because such offences “capture a wide variety of 
conduct”—and on this basis, the weight to be placed on rehabilitation is 
best left to judges case by case.12 In less serious cases, the point of this seems 
For Australian cases, see R v Lodhi, [2006] NSWSC 691 [Lodhi]; Lodhi v R, [2007] NSWCCA 
360 [Lodhi (CA)]; R v Touma, [2008] NSWSC 1475; R v Sharrouf, [2009] NSWSC 1002; R v 
Mulahalilovic, [2009] NSWSC 1010; and R v Elomar, [2010] NSWSC 10.
8.  Khawaja (Ont Ca), ibid; Khalid (Ont CA), ibid; Amara (Ont CA), ibid; and Gaya (Ont 
CA), ibid.
9.  See R v Martin, [1999] 1 Cr App R (S) 477; Lodhi (CA), supra note 7, R v Touma, supra 
note 7; R v Sharrouf, supra note 7; R v Mulahalilovic, supra note 7; and R v Elomar, supra 
note 7.
10.  See discussion below of Lodhi (CA) supra note 7; R v Touma, supra note 7; R v Sharrouf, 
supra note 7; and R v Mulahalilovic, supra note 7;
11.  Khawaja (SCC), supra note 3.
12.  Ibid at para 124.
clear: judges should be free to place more emphasis on rehabilitation where 
they can easily balance this objective with the demands of denunciation 
and deterrence. But the Court’s reasoning does not explain why judges 
should be free to give more weight to rehabilitation in very serious cases, 
where the demands of denunciation and deterrence would seem—at least 
in the view of earlier courts—to be so pressing as to require a primary, 
if not exclusive, focus. The Court’s reasoning also leaves unclear why it 
contemplated the possibility that rehabilitation might have played a more 
important role in Khawaja itself. 
The first part of this paper surveys the trial and appeal decisions in 
Khawaja, together with the principles from British and Australian cases 
on which the Ontario Court of Appeal drew in formulating its categorical 
position on the role of rehabilitation in terror sentencing. The second 
part examines the Supreme Court’s reasons, highlighting the break 
they mark with earlier jurisprudence. Then, in an effort to make sense 
of the Court’s unique position in Khawaja within a broader theory of 
punishment, the third part briefly considers the holding in light of the 
work of Antony Duff, and in particular, Duff’s attempts to address the 
challenge that terrorism offenders pose to a rehabilitative conception of 
criminal justice.13 
Duff, a prominent British criminal law theorist who now teaches 
in the US, has offered a set of arguments for why a liberal state should 
remain committed to a rehabilitative approach to punishment even for its 
most serious offenders. These arguments help to shed light on the issues 
at stake in, and the deeper implications of, the Court’s commitment to 
the potential role of rehabilitation in every terrorism case. To the degree 
that Khawaja is consistent with Duff’s theory, this paper will argue that 
the decision marks an important affirmation on the part of the Supreme 
Court of a distinctly liberal conception of political community in which 
the concepts of moral agency, equality, and redemption are central.
13.  For Duff’s general theory of punishment, see RA Duff, Punishment, Communication, 
and Community (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001) [Duff, “Punishment”]. For his 
application of this theory to the problem of the terrorism offender, see RA Duff, “Penance, 
Punishment, and the Limits of Community” (2003) 5:3 Punishment and Society 295 [Duff 
Penance]; “Notes on Punishment and Terrorism” (2005) 48:6 American Behavioral Scientist 
758 [Duff, “Terrorism”]; and “Responsibility, Citizenship, and Criminal Law” in RA Duff 
and Stuart P Green, eds, Philosophical Foundations of the Criminal Law (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011) 125 [Duff, “Responsibility”].
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I. Context of the Supreme Court’s Decision in 
Khawaja
A. A Note on Rehabilitation in Canadian Sentencing Law
Before turning to the cases, it may be helpful to briefly address how the 
principle of rehabilitation functions within the Criminal Code framework 
for sentencing. While the Code affirms the importance of rehabilitation 
in the crafting of any given sentence, judges must weigh this objective 
against several other competing considerations. 
For example, section 718 of the Code states that “the fundamental 
purpose of sentencing” is to contribute to “the maintenance of a just, 
peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or 
more” of a list of six “objectives”, including these: “to denounce unlawful 
conduct;” “to deter the offender and other persons from committing 
offences;” “to separate offenders from society, where necessary;” and 
“to assist in rehabilitating offenders”.14 A sentencing judge could thus be 
consistent with section 718 in placing a primary, or even an exclusive, 
emphasis on rehabilitation or in ignoring it altogether. However, any 
sentence must also be in accord with the “fundamental principle” of 
sentencing set out in section 718.1, which states that “[a] sentence must be 
proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility 
of the offender.”15 The extent to which a sentence may have rehabilitative 
objectives is also indirectly affected by the operation of other provisions, 
including 718.2, which mandates that a sentence should be increased to 
account for aggravating circumstances, which include “evidence that 
the offence was a terrorism offence”.16 This provision also requires that 
“where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should 
not be unduly long or harsh”,17 and that “all available sanctions other 
14.  Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C–46, s 718 [emphasis added].
15.  Ibid, s 718.1 [emphasis added].
16.  Ibid, s 718.2(a)(v). While it may be an aggravating circumstance that the offence at 
issue is a “terrorism offence,” there is no indication in the Criminal Code that the addition 
of this provision was meant to preclude the consideration of rehabilitation when deciding 
upon a sentence for a terrorism offence. I am indebted to one of the referees of this paper 
for pointing this out.
17.  Ibid, s 718.2(c).
than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be 
considered for all offenders”.18 
In the context of terrorism offences in particular, three provisions 
added to the Code with the Anti-Terrorism Act are potentially relevant 
to the question of rehabilitation.19 None of the new terrorism offences 
added to the Code by that Act carry minimum sentences, and offences 
such as participating in or facilitating terrorism carry maximum penalties 
of 10 and 14 years respectively.20 However, the Act added a provision 
by which these and other maximum penalties for terror related offences 
could be circumvented. Section 83.27 of the Code states broadly that 
notwithstanding any other provision of the Code, “a person convicted 
of an indictable offence, other than an offence for which a sentence of 
imprisonment for life is imposed as a minimum punishment” is liable to 
receive a life sentence if “the act or omission constituting the offence also 
constitutes a terrorist activity.”21 The Anti-Terrorism Act also stipulates that 
where multiple sentences for terrorism offences are imposed, other than 
one of life imprisonment, the sentences are to be served consecutively.22 
Finally, another provision gives courts the discretion to raise the parole 
ineligibility period for those convicted of terrorism offences from either 
one-third of the sentence or seven years, whichever is shorter, to one-half 
or ten years.23
Recent amendments to the Code add a further factor that might affect 
the weight to be given to rehabilitation in the terrorism context. Both first 
and second-degree murder carry a mandatory life sentence in Canada.24 
Before Bill C–48 was passed in 2011, the longest period that offenders 
being sentenced for either single or multiple murders could be required to 
serve before being eligible for parole was twenty-five years.25 Now, when 
courts sentence offenders for multiple murders, parole ineligibility can 
18.  Ibid, s 718.2(e).
19.  Supra note 5. 
20.  Criminal Code, supra note 14, ss 83.18, 83.19.
21.  Ibid, s 83.27. The Crown is required to give notice to the accused of its intention to 
proceed under this provision prior to a plea being entered. Ibid, s 83.27(2),
22.  Ibid, s 83.26. Judicial treatment of this provision is discussed below.
23.  Ibid, s 743.6(1.1).
24.  Ibid, s 745.
25.  Protecting Canadians by Ending Sentence Discounts for Multiple Murders Act, SC 2011, 
c 5.
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be much longer—possibly well beyond the offender’s life expectancy—
through the imposition of consecutive twenty-five-year periods of 
ineligibility for each conviction. Such consecutive terms, however, are 
discretionary rather than mandatory.26
Thus, in terrorism cases, as in any other sentencing context, judges must 
weigh rehabilitation against a host of other principles and considerations. 
Yet rehabilitation remains a potentially important consideration in this 
context. Just how important is a question that Canadian courts began to 
grapple with in R v Khawaja.
B. The Trial Decision in Khawaja (Ontario Superior Court)
The accused was a twenty-five-year old Ottawa resident who, in 2002, 
formed an association with a group of extremists in the UK and Pakistan.27 
He travelled to London and Lahore, where he briefly attended a training 
camp, and gave other members of the group money and access to his 
parents’ apartment in Pakistan. Before the group was arrested in March 
2004, Khawaja worked on the prototype of a remote-detonation explosive 
device he called the “hifidigimonster.” He agreed to build roughly thirty 
of them for the group’s use in the UK or elsewhere.
Principal members of the London group were found in possession of 
600 kilograms of ammonium nitrate-rich fertilizer, along with maps of the 
UK’s national utility grid. In the prosecution of Khawaja’s co-conspirators 
in the UK, these materials were found to have been part of a specific 
plot to set off explosions at targets in central London (the fertilizer bomb 
plot). Wiretap evidence raised questions about the extent of Khawaja’s 
knowledge of the plot, given that he participated in discussions of targets 
that included airports, nightclubs, and fuel, water and energy utilities. 
In a search of Khawaja’s Ottawa home, police seized various electronic 
components, 2 semi-automatic military rifles, 640 rounds of ammunition, 
documents relating to violent jihad, and $10300 in cash.
A large part of Khawaja’s defence consisted of the claim that he lacked 
knowledge of the fertilizer bomb plot, and that his primary intention was 
26.  Criminal Code, supra note 14, s 745.51(1).
27.  Khawaja (Ont Sup Crt), supra note 7. The following summary of the facts draws on 
details set out at paragraphs 1 to 16 of the decision.
to assist the group in their involvement with insurgents in Afghanistan.28 
Justice Rutherford had a reasonable doubt about Khawaja’s knowledge 
of the fertilizer plot, but convicted him on six counts of terror-related 
offences. The most serious was that of intending to cause an explosion 
endangering life, and doing so in association with a terrorist group.29 
Justice Rutherford suggested that Khawaja did not simply intend to assist 
with the group’s plans in Afghanistan. Rather, his activity in building the 
hifidigimonster was “directed at assisting his terrorist associates in a way 
that could only result in serious injury, death and destruction to people 
and property somewhere”.30 Justice Rutherford imposed a global sentence 
of 10.5 years, which took some account of Khawaja’s roughly 5 years in 
pre-trial custody.31 Parole non-eligibility was set at five years.32 
In arriving at this sentence, Rutherford J considered as mitigating 
circumstances Khawaja’s age, lack of a criminal record, and conduct in 
prison. While Rutherford J acknowledged that in terror cases the emphasis 
should be placed on “denunciation, deterrence, and protection of the 
public”,33 he also noted that “the potential for rehabilitation . . . cannot be 
overlooked”.34 Yet in this case, he concluded, “the Court knows virtually 
nothing about [Khawaja’s] potential for reformation, of any sense of 
responsibility or of any remorse he may feel for his criminal conduct, 
or of the likelihood of his re-offending”.35 Khawaja had not testified, he 
refused to be interviewed for the pre-sentence report and he made no 
28.  Ibid at para 32.
29.  Ibid at para 3. See Criminal Code RS C 1985, c C–46 ss 81(1)(a), 83.2 (both carrying a life 
maximum). The remaining offences were: participating in a terrorist group (for receiving 
training) (s 83.18(1); 10 year maximum); instructing to carry out activity for terrorist group 
(ss 83.21(1); a life maximum); making property available to facilitate a terrorist activity 
(ss 83.03(a); a 10-year maximum); participating in a terrorist activity (meetings in the UK 
relating to bomb-building) (ss 83.18(1); a 10-year maximum); and facilitating a terrorist 
activity (ss 83.19; a 14-year maximum). Ibid at para 34. 
30.  Ibid at para 4.
31.  Ibid at para 54. Khawaja received four years for bomb-building in association with a 
terrorist group; two years each for participation in the training camp, providing funding, 
and making property available; and three months for participating in discussions relating 
to terrorism activity in the UK and facilitating those activities. Ibid.
32.  Ibid at para 55.
33.  Ibid at para 24.
34.  Ibid at para 26.
35.  Ibid at para 27.
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statement at sentencing. Because Khawaja’s rehabilitative prospects were 
uncertain, Rutherford J treated them as neutral factors.36
The sentence also turned on an assessment of Khawaja’s degree of 
responsibility. Justice Rutherford dismissed the suggestion that Khawaja’s 
lack of knowledge of the specific intent of his associates to use the 
hifidigimonster in the fertilizer bomb plot was a mitigating factor. The 
detonators were clearly “intended to unleash fireworks at other as yet 
unspecified places in aid of the jihad”.37 Yet Rutherford J did not consider 
Khawaja’s culpability to be comparable to that of his co-conspirators 
who received life sentences in the UK in R v Khyam.38 Although Khawaja 
was “a willing helper and supporter”, Rutherford J asserted four of the 
named members of the group “were away out in front of [him] in terms 
of their determination to bring death, destruction and terror to innocent 
people”.39 Yet apart from noting Khawaja’s lack of specific knowledge of 
the fertilizer plot, Rutherford J did not explain that difference.40 
The direction in 718.2(c) of the Code, calling for a global sentence that 
is not “unduly long or harsh,” posed a further challenge in light of the 
requirement for consecutive sentences in section 83.26. Justice Rutherford 
interpreted each of those sections as a constraint on the other. To support 
this reading, he drew on Lamer CJ’s dictum in the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s decision in R v M (CA),41 to the effect that “[w]hether under 
the rubric of the ‘totality principle’ or a more generalized principle of 
proportionality, Canadian courts have been reluctant to impose single and 
consecutive fixed-term sentences beyond 20 years.”42 Justice Rutherford 
therefore implied that where consecutive sentences were imposed for 
terror offences, they should not exceed that ceiling. 43
36.  Ibid at para 29.
37.  Ibid at para 32.
38.  R v Khyam, supra note 7.
39.  Khawaja (Ont Sup Crt), supra note 7 at para 37.
40.  Khawaja’s co-conspirators in the UK, apart from Khyam, also lacked knowledge of 
the specifics. 
41.  [1996] 1 SCR 500, 46 CR (4th) 269.
42.  Ibid at para 43, cited in Khawaja (Ont Sup Crt), supra note 7 at para 39.
43.  Justice Rutherford’s treatment of the totality principle is relevant in the sense that he 
can be said to have imposed a sentence of roughly 20.5 years: i.e., the 10.5 years of further 
custody, along with credit for the 5 years spent in pre-trial custody (which, at the time, was 
conventionally credited at 2 for 1, or 10 years, but not explicitly acknowledged as such in 
this case). 
Both the Crown and the defence appealed the sentence.
C. The Court of Appeal Decision 
On appeal, Khawaja’s sentence on count 1 (bomb-building in 
association with a terror group) was raised from 4 years to life without 
parole for 10 years. The sentence on the remaining counts was raised from 
6 to 24 years, to be served concurrently. The Court of Appeal allowed the 
Crown’s appeal on the basis of three specific errors in the decision below 
and an error in the “overall approach” to the sentencing of terrorism 
offences.44
The first of the three specific errors was an incorrect assessment of 
Khawaja’s “level of determination”,45 or his culpability in relation to that 
of his UK co-conspirators. The finding that the latter “‘were away out in 
front’ of the appellant ‘in terms of their determination to bring death, 
destruction and terror to innocent people’ [was] not borne out by the 
record”.46 The record, including the emails cited in the trial decision, 
attested to a deep “commitment to violent Jihad” and a “willingness to do 
anything and go anywhere to promote violent Jihad”.47 
A more serious error was treating the lack of evidence of rehabilitative 
prospects as a neutral, rather than a negative, factor. In the Court of 
Appeal’s view, “the absence of any evidence of the appellant’s remorse or 
of his prospects for reformation should have been treated as a significant 
indicator of his present and future dangerousness”.48 Without “convincing 
evidence” that violent Jihad has been repudiated, a terrorism offender 
“continues to pose a serious threat to society and is likely to do so for 
the indefinite future”.49 Even where the offender does repudiate terror, 
the Court sought to affirm the broader principle that “the import of 
rehabilitation as a mitigating circumstance is significantly reduced in this 
context given the unique nature of the crime of terrorism and the grave 
and far-reaching threat that it poses to the foundations of our democratic 
44.  Khawaja (Ont CA), supra note 7 at para 192.
45.  Ibid at para 191.
46.  Ibid at para 194, citing Khawaja (Ont Sup Crt), supra note 7 at para 37. 
47.  Ibid.
48.  Ibid at para 200.
49.  Ibid.
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society”.50 Yet in this case, the court concluded “there is simply no evidence 
at all of any rehabilitative potential on the part of the appellant”.51
A third error pertained to Rutherford J’s resolution of the apparent 
conflict between sections 83.26 (consecutive sentences) and 718.2(c) (the 
totality principle—not “unduly long”). Justice Rutherford read R v M(CA) 
to stand for the proposition that twenty years marks a notional benchmark 
for what is “unduly long or harsh” in section 718.2(c), one that would 
apply to the directive to impose consecutive sentences in section 83.26. 
The Court of Appeal held that this reading ran counter to the holding 
in R v M(CA), and to the intention to include section 83.26 in the terror 
sentencing framework. In R v M(CA), the Supreme Court of Canada had 
confirmed the validity of a twenty-five-year global sentence that consisted 
of shorter consecutive terms.52 It found that although courts had in recent 
years tended not to exceed the twenty-year mark, neither the Code nor 
the Charter’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment precluded 
it.53 
Turning to the larger error in “overall approach,” the Court of Appeal 
set out three general grounds on which Rutherford J’s sentence was 
“manifestly unfit”.54 First, it did not adequately reflect the “enormity” of 
the crime:
Terrorism, in our view, is in a special category of crime and must be treated as such. When 
the terrorist activity, to the knowledge of the offender, is designed to or is likely to result 
in the indiscriminate injury and killing of innocent human beings, sentences exceeding 20 
years, up to and including life imprisonment, should not be viewed as exceptional.55
50.  Ibid at para 201.
51.  Ibid at para 202.
52.  Supra note 41 at para 94.
53.  Ibid at para 72. The Court of Appeal’s treatment of the totality principle and the 
significance of R v M(CA) are explored further below.
54.  Khawaja (Ont CA), supra note 7 at para 192.
55.  Khawaja (Ont CA), supra note 7 at para 238. The judgment contains this qualification:
In advocating this sentencing approach to terrorist-related activity that, to the 
offender’s knowledge, is designed to or is likely to result in the indiscriminate 
killing of innocent human beings, we are not suggesting that there will never be 
cases of that nature for which the appropriate sentence will be within or below 
the 15- to 20-year customary range. For example, full and meaningful co-operation 
by the offender with law enforcement authorities in the detection of terrorists 
A second error in approach was that the sentence “fails to adequately 
reflect the continuing danger that this offender presents to society”, based 
on the absence of evidence of remorse.56 Finally, for deterrent purposes, 
the sentence had to be severe enough to “send a clear and unmistakable 
message that terrorism is reprehensible and those who choose to engage 
in it here will pay a very heavy price”.57 
D. The Court of Appeal’s Development of Earlier UK and Australian 
Approaches
To lend further context to Supreme Court’s decision in Khawaja, this 
section briefly examines a broader set of propositions set out by the Court 
of Appeal in this case and in its companion decisions in Khalid, Gaya and 
Amara.58 These cases are also assessed in light of the appellate decisions 
from the UK and Australia on which they drew. 
For the Court of Appeal in Khawaja, a longer sentence was necessary 
not only because Khawaja’s involvement in the plot was serious, but also 
because the absence of evidence on rehabilitation suggested that he posed 
a continuing danger. It was also compelled by the categorical proposition 
the Court set out in the companion appeal of Khalid—that the “import of 
rehabilitation as a mitigating circumstance is significantly reduced in this 
context given the unique nature of the crime of terrorism and the grave 
and far-reaching threat that it poses to the foundations of our democratic 
society”.59 In other words, because terrorism offences are distinct in 
nature and involve special considerations, rehabilitation must generally 
play a lesser role in sentencing, regardless of the degree of culpability. 
The companion appeals in Khalid and Gaya, two cases involving more 
peripheral members of the “Toronto 18” plot, best illustrate the Court of 
Appeal’s reliance on this proposition. 
and terrorist activity may well alleviate against the imposition of longer than 
customary sentences. 
Ibid at para 220.
56.  Ibid at para 239.
57.  Ibid at para 246.
58.  Khawaja (Ont CA), supra note 7; Khalid (Ont CA), supra note 7; Amara (Ont CA), 
supra note 7; and Gaya (Ont CA), supra note 7.
59.  Khawaja (Ont CA), supra note 7 at para 201.
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The accused in Khalid was a nineteen-year-old member of the group 
who assisted in the preparation of explosive materials, and who thus 
intended to cause explosions endangering life, but he lacked knowledge 
of the specific target of the bombs and other details of the plot. At trial, 
Durno J found that Khalid’s rehabilitative prospects were favourable 
and that he posed no continuing danger to the community.60 On this 
basis, he imposed a 14-year sentence rather than the 20 years sought by 
the Crown. The Court of Appeal held that the gravity of the offence 
warranted a life sentence and that Khalid’s rehabilitative prospects could 
only justify bringing the sentence down into the range of twenty years. 
By imposing a shorter sentence, the trial judge had erred in placing 
“considerable emphasis on the respondent’s youth, his lack of criminal 
record, his remorse and his prospects for rehabilitation”.61 In a terrorism 
case, the Court of Appeal said, less emphasis should have been placed on 
the offender and more on the offence itself: “When balanced against the 
nature and seriousness of the crime, [the offender’s personal] factors are 
entitled to considerably less weight”.62 
Gaya involved an eighteen-year-old who had been a member of the 
Toronto 18 for roughly a month. He was tasked with finding a place 
to store three tons of ammonium nitrate, but had limited knowledge of 
the larger plot.63 He pleaded guilty to intending to cause an explosion 
endangering life, and doing so in association with a terrorist group.64 
He provided a statement to police, was remorseful, and took full 
responsibility for the offence. Justice Durno emphasized that Gaya was 
“not the prime mover in the plot. He did not know all the details of the 
plan. He took detailed orders. He did not give them . . . He did not know 
anything about bomb making.”65 Gaya’s rehabilitative prospects and his 
experience in custody had led Durno J to conclude that he “has already 
been specifically deterred and is not a continuing danger to the public”.66 
60.  Khalid (Ont Sup Ct), supra note 7 at para 143.
61.  Khalid (Ont CA), supra note 7 at para 41.
62.  Ibid at para 45 [emphasis added].
63.  See Gaya (Ont Sup Crt), supra note 7 (at a pre-trial hearing, Durno J found that Gaya 
was “wilfully blind that it was likely that the explosion(s) would cause death or serious 
bodily harm” at para 3).
64.  Contrary to Criminal Code, supra note 14, ss 81(1); 83.2.
65.  Gaya (Ont Sup Ct), supra note 7 at para 120.
66.  Ibid at para 133.
Justice Durno imposed a twelve-year sentence, with parole eligibility set 
at one-third of the remaining time to be served. The Court of Appeal 
raised Gaya’s sentence to eighteen years, and moved his parole eligibility 
period up to half of the remaining time to be served. It did so on the basis 
that Durno J’s sentence “did not adequately reflect the unique nature of 
terrorism-related crimes, nor did it adequately reflect the enormity of the 
respondent’s crime and the role he played in it”.67
In formulating the rule that rehabilitation should play a lesser role 
in terror sentencing generally, the Ontario Court of Appeal expanded 
the scope of a proposition that, in its recent form, originated with the 
commonly cited dicta of Lord Bingham CJ in the 1997 English Court 
of Appeal decision in R v Martin.68 Martin involved an Irish Republican 
Army conspiracy to set off explosions at an electricity plant, endangering 
but not specifically targeting human life. Lord Bingham held that the 
appropriate range of sentence for a terrorist conspiracy to cause an 
explosion endangering life should range from 20 to 35 years.69 He went on 
to state that “[i]n passing sentence for the most serious terrorist offences, the 
object of the court will be to punish, deter and incapacitate; rehabilitation 
is likely to play a minor (if any) part.”70 The role of rehabilitation was 
thus minimized in Martin, not necessarily for all terror offences but for 
“the most serious” of them. By contrast, for the Ontario Court of Appeal 
in Khawaja, Khalid, Gaya and Amara, rehabilitation should play a minor 
67.  Gaya (Ont CA), supra note 7 at para 19.
68.  R v Martin, supra note 9. 
69.  Martin was thus decided within a sentencing framework distinct from that set out in 
Canada’s Criminal Code—one that contemplates much longer sentences than were likely 
to be imposed in Canada both prior to the Anti-terrorism Act, supra note 5, and in relation 
to the cases under review in this article. For the differences between the two frameworks, 
see Diab, supra note 5 at 372–375.
70.  R v Martin, supra note 9 at 480. The Ontario Court of Appeal cites this passage in 
Khalid (CA), supra note 7 at 39, along with Rutherford J in Khawaja (Ont Sup Crt), supra 
note 7 at para 24, and Leblonde CJQ in R c Namouh, 2010 QCCQ 943 at para 36 (available 
on WL Can). Spigelman CJ of the New South Wales Court of Appeal cites Lord Bingham’s 
dicta in Lodhi (CA), supra note 7 at para 89, along with Whealy J of the Supreme Court 
of New South Wales in R v Touma, supra note 7 at para 73; R v Sharrouf, supra note 7 at 
para 60; R v Mulahalilovic, supra note 7 at para 42; and R v Elomar, supra note 7 at para 78.
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role in all terrorism cases.71 This more expansive formulation marked a 
subtle shift from Martin, but a shift consistent with a tendency in other 
recent cases to characterize terrorism offences as belonging in a class of 
their own, with rehabilitation generally having little or no role to play.72 
That characterization may have been due in part to perceptions about the 
greater magnitude of the threat posed by terrorism in the wake of 9/11.73 
However, a closer look at Lord Bingham’s decision in Martin suggests 
that the tendency to treat terrorism as a distinct form of crime, with 
different rules on sentencing, has deeper roots in the common law. Lord 
Bingham drew authority for his approach to terrorism offences from a 
passage in Lord Lawton’s 1975 Court of Appeal decision in R v Turner, 
which involved a bank robbery.74 Lord Lawton said:
Grave crimes fall into categories. There are some which are wholly abnormal. Their 
circumstances are horrifying. They may endanger the State. What is to be done with those 
who commit such crimes? There are other crimes which are very grave but which cannot 
be regarded as wholly abnormal.
71.  Khawaja (Ont CA), supra note 7; Khalid (Ont CA), supra note 7: Gaya (Ont CA), supra 
note 7; and Amara (Ont CA), supra note 7. The Court of Appeal decisions in Khawaja, 
Khalid, Amara, and Gaya are each per curiam judgments of Doherty, Moldaver, and Cronk 
JJA.
72.  Examples are explored below.
73.  See R v Barot, supra note 7. This rationale appears explicit in Lord Phillips CJ’s 
opinion. The case involved a plot to set off a series of explosions in the parkade of a large 
London office building. His Lordship wrote: 
We consider that [Crown counsel] is also correct in submitting that terrorist offences 
today are capable of being more serious even than the horrifying case of Hindawi 
[(1988) 10 Cr App R (S) 104, where the appellant attempted to bomb a plane by 
placing a bomb in his unwitting girlfriend’s suitcase]. This case demonstrates the 
search by the terrorists for a means of causing death on an even greater scale than 
results from the destruction of a passenger plane and the events of 9/11 show that 
this can be achieved. It is not without significance that in A v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 AC 68 the majority of the 
House of Lords accepted that the terrorist threat represented ‘a public emergency 
threatening the life of the nation’. For this reason we have concluded that the 
guidelines suggested by the court in Martin require review.
Ibid at para 55.
74.  (1975) 61 Cr App Rep 67.
Into the first category fall such crimes as the Great Train Robbery, bad cases of espionage, 
cases of horrid violence such as occurred in the case of Richardson and Others (1967) 51 Cr. 
App. R. 381, known as the ‘Torture Case’. We are running into an era when the courts 
are finding themselves having to deal with bomb outrages, acts of political terrorism and 
possibly in the future acts of political kidnapping. The courts must have some range of 
penalties to deal with those abnormal crimes.75
By adopting Lord Lawton’s notion in Turner that there was a relatively 
new order of “abnormal” crime, Lord Bingham was suggesting that in 
sentencing the terrorism offender, the Court was confronted with new 
considerations distinct from those at play in a conventional criminal 
case. A longer sentence should be imposed for conspiracy to commit 
terrorism than would normally be imposed in a murder case, because, 
in Lord Bingham’s words, “there can be no precise equivalence” between 
conventional murder and terrorism. 76 The latter involved “conduct 
threatening the democratic government and the security of the state, and 
the daily life and livelihood of millions of people”; it therefore has “a 
seriousness all of its own.”77 
 It is one thing, however, to assert that a different approach on 
sentencing is called for by significant involvement in a serious terror plot 
and another to assert that courts should take a different approach in all 
terror cases, regardless of the extent of the offender’s involvement. Yet 
recent decisions citing Martin had tended to gloss over this difference. 
One example is provided by the opinion of Price J of the New South 
Wales Court of Appeal in the 2006 case of R v Lodhi, the leading post-9/11 
terror sentencing case in Australia.78 With the intention of carrying out 
a bombing, Lodhi had collected maps of the Australian electrical supply 
75.  Ibid at 91. 
76.  Martin, supra note 9 at 478.
77.  Ibid. In the post-9/11 period, a number of legal scholars have taken up the question 
of whether terrorism should be considered a unique offence or should fall within a special 
category of crime. See, e.g., George Fletcher, “The Indefinable Concept of Terrorism” (2006) 
4:5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 894. “The better way to think of terrorism . . . is 
not as a crime but as a different dimension of crime, a higher, more dangerous version of 
crime, a kind of super-crime incorporating some of the characteristics of warfare.” Ibid at 
900. See also Thomas Weigend, “The Universal Terrorist: the International Community 
Grappling with a Definition” (2006) 4:5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 912; 
and Mohammed Saif-Alden Wattad, “Is Terrorism a Crime or an Aggravating Factor in 
Sentencing?” (2006) 4:5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1017.
78.  Lodhi (CA), supra note 7.
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system and had made efforts to obtain explosives. He was convicted 
of collecting a document, possessing a thing, and doing a thing, all in 
preparation for a terrorist act.79 He was thus conspiring to carry out a 
serious plot but was at a very early stage of the matter, in comparison 
to the more extensive steps taken by the parties in Martin.80 Justice Price 
upheld the twenty-year sentence imposed at trial, partly on the basis of a 
more expansive formulation of the principle in Martin:
Rehabilitation and personal circumstances should often be given very little weight in the 
case of an offender who is charged with a terrorism offence. A terrorism offence is an 
outrageous offence and greater weight is to be given to the protection of society, personal 
and general deterrence and retribution.81 
Wheally J of the New South Wales Supreme Court would then cite both 
the appellate holding in Lodhi and Lord Bingham’s dicta in Martin in each 
79.  See the Australian Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), ss 101.4, 101.5, 101.6, as amended by 
Criminal Code Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 (Cth).
80.  See R v Martin, supra note 9. Bingham CJ notes that the parties:
[T]ook a number of steps such as acquiring premises and vehicles, carrying out 
research and planning, reconnoitering five of the [power] sub-stations, purchasing 
equipment, making 37 long delay Time and Power Units for the 37 bombs to be 
used at the sub-stations, buying and dismantling ladders for ease of concealment and 
constructing wooden blocks with which to reassemble the ladders. The appellant 
and all of the convicted conspirators had a false identity and were supplied by 
PIRA with money to finance the operation.
Ibid at para 2.
81.  Lodhi (CA), supra note 7 at para 274. It bears noting that the discussion of sentencing 
principles in Lodhi is fundamentally shaped by the distinct considerations of the sentencing 
framework in Australian criminal law legislation, which differs in subtle but important 
ways from the framework in both the UK and Canada. For a brief overview of these 
differences, see Diab, supra note 5 at 375–377 (For reasons explored there, Australian judges 
have greater flexibility than Canadian judges in emphasizing deterrence and concerns about 
public safety over other principles of sentencing).
of four decisions82 involving offenders whose level of culpability ranged 
from very serious to more peripheral.83
A further example of an expansive restatement of the Martin principle 
can be found in Rutherford J’s trial decision in Khawaja where this general 
proposition was asserted:
In terrorism sentencing cases particular emphasis is placed on the elements of denunciation, 
deterrence, and protection of the public by separating the offender from it. Moreover, 
where acts of terrorism are pursued for religious or ideological cause, it may be considered 
that even personal deterrence may be of less significance than protection of the public.84
One might argue that the tendency in these cases to restate Lord Bingham’s 
dicta in more expansive terms had little effect on their outcomes. 
Rehabilitation was either factored in to some degree (as in the trial decision 
in Khawaja), or the offences were so serious that rehabilitation was bound 
to play only a small role (as in Lodhi and Elomar).85 The point, however, 
is that the cases noted here exhibit a tendency to cite the rule in Martin 
without acknowledging its limited scope. And this tendency might be 
said to have culminated in the Ontario Court of Appeal’s expansion of 
Martin into a categorical proposition in Khawaja, in the manner explored 
above. In both Khalid and Gaya, this led to the raising of the sentences 
originally imposed at trial, where the principle of rehabilitation had played 
82.  For citations to Lohdi (CA), supra note 7, see R v Touma, supra note 7 at para 131; R 
v Sharrouf supra note 7 at para 59; R v Mulahalilovic, supra note 7 at para 41; R v Elomar, 
supra note 7 at para 78. For citations to R v Martin, supra note 9, see R v Touma, supra note 
7 at para 73; R v Sharrouf supra note 7 at para 60; R v Mulahalilovic, supra note 7 at para 42; 
R v Elomar, supra note 7 at para 78.
83.  See e.g. R v Mulahalilovic, supra note 7 at para 63 (Mulahalilovic’s culpability consisted 
primarily in his recklessness as to the possible terrorist use of the ammunition he provided 
to conspirators who were involved in a plot in which the offender was unaware). See 
also R v Sharrouf, supra note 7. The case concerned the acquisition of various clocks and 
batteries for a terrorist group, with knowledge that they were to be used to build explosive 
devices for a terrorist act. The court, however, also found that Sharrouf had suffered from 
a “serious schizophrenic condition” at the time of the offence. Ibid at paras 44–45.
84.  Khawaja (Ont Sup Crt), supra note 7 at para 24. Notably, however, Rutherford J also 
held that “Notwithstanding the emphasis on denunciation, deterrence and protection of 
the public, the potential for rehabilitation and promotion of a sense of responsibility on 
the part of the offender cannot be overlooked. Momin Khawaja is still a young man. There 
is evidence of some redeeming qualities in him.” Ibid at para 26.
85.  Lodhi (CA), supra note 7, and R v Elomar, supra note 7.
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a larger role. It is precisely this expansion of Martin, and the categorical 
minimization of rehabilitation in this context, that the Supreme Court in 
Khawaja would reject.
II. The Supreme Court Decision and Its Break 
from Earlier Approaches
Writing for a unanimous court of seven justices, McLachlin CJ began 
her analysis in the sentencing appeal portion of the decision by asserting 
a broad proposition:
At the outset, I wish to underscore that the temptation to fashion rigid sentencing principles 
applicable to terrorism offences as a distinct class of offences should be avoided, subject to 
the provisions in the Criminal Code that specifically pertain to those offences. The general 
principles of sentencing, including the totality principle, apply to terrorism offences.86
Terror offences are therefore to be approached on sentencing as any 
other offence in the Criminal Code not subject to a mandatory minimum; 
or, put another way, the Court’s point of departure was in rejecting 
Lord Bingham’s notion in Martin that terror offences were somehow 
“abnormal”, or that they belonged, as the Ontario Court of Appeal had 
put it in Khawaja, to a “special category of crime”.87The Supreme Court 
therefore agreed with the Court of Appeal in its result, but sought to 
signal from the outset that it was doing so on the basis of a deeper shift 
in approach. 
Turning to the first of three specific errors found in the trial judgment 
by the Court of Appeal, McLachlin CJ agreed with the first. In her words, 
the trial judge’s decision and particularly the finding that Khawaja was 
“less morally blameworthy than Khyam and other associates”, entailed 
an “unreasonable devaluation of the seriousness of the appellant’s 
conduct”.88 The evidence, she went on, had clearly indicated that Khawaja 
was as involved as his conterparts in the UK,89 and that his intention to 
86.  Khawaja (SCC), supra note 3 at para 115.
87.  Khawaja (Ont CA), supra note 7 at para 238.
88.  Khawaja (SCC), supra note 3 at para 117.
89.  Ibid at paras 116–117.
“‘bring death, destruction and terror to innocent people’ appears to have 
been . . . as strong as that of other members of the Khyam group”.90
The Chief Justice also agreed that the trial judge had erred in treating 
the absence of rehabilitative prospects as a neutral factor. But she rejected 
the Court of Appeal’s broader proposition about rehabilitation. For the 
Court of Appeal, even if there had been promising evidence on that matter, 
the weight to be placed on rehabilitation was “significantly reduced” in 
light of the special nature of the offence.91 McLachlin CJ’s response to this 
portion of the appeal court’s judgment was twofold. First, she held that 
the “[t]he lack of information on a person’s probability of re-offending, 
in the face of compelling evidence of dangerousness, is sufficient to justify 
a stiffer sentence.”92 A longer sentence was therefore appropriate in this 
case without recourse to the proposition that rehabilitation should play 
a lesser role in terror sentencing generally. But the Chief Justice asked 
whether rehabilitation might have played a more important role here if the 
evidence had been different: “The absence of evidence on the appellant’s 
likelihood of re-offending gave the trial judge no assurance that he was no 
longer committed to violent jihad and terrorism, or that there was any 
chance that, over time, he could change and be released from state control 
without undue risk of harm to the population.”93 Thus, even though 
Khawaja’s conduct fell near the higher end of the spectrum of culpability 
in terrorism offences (“as strong as that of other members of the Khyam 
group”94—who all received life sentences in the UK), rehabilitation was 
not an inappropriate consideration as a matter of principle. 
The second part of McLachlin CJ’s response consisted of a clear 
rejection of the larger rule at issue in the Court of Appeal’s decisions in 
Khawaja, Khalid, Gaya and Amara:
I cannot accept the broad proposition that “the import of rehabilitation as a mitigating 
circumstance is significantly reduced in [the] context [of terrorism] given the unique nature 
of the crime . . . and the grave and far-reaching threat that it poses to the foundations of our 
democratic society” (C.A., at para. 201). The terrorism provisions catch a very wide variety 
of conduct, suggesting that the weight to be given to rehabilitation in a given case is best 
90.  Ibid at para 121, citing to Khawaja (Ont Sup Crt), supra note 7 at para 37. 
91.  Khawaja (Ont CA), supra note 7 at para 201.
92.  Khawaja (SCC), supra note 3 at para 123.
93.  Ibid.
94.  Khawaja (SCC), supra note 3 at para 121.
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left to the reasoned discretion of trial judges on a case-by-case basis. This does not, however, 
negate the fact that on the evidence in this case, the absence of evidence on rehabilitation 
prospects justified a stiffer sentence than otherwise might have been appropriate.95 
The Court therefore rejected the Court of Appeal’s categorical de-
emphasis on rehabilitation in terror sentencing generally. It also implied 
that even in a case as serious as Khawaja, rehabilitation might have played 
a meaningful role in crafting the sentence had there been better evidence of 
rehabilitative prospects. What effect this might have had on the sentence 
was left unclear—a slightly shorter sentence term, perhaps, or a shorter 
period of parole ineligibility, or both. 
A further point should not be overlooked. By refusing to endorse 
the Court of Appeal’s categorical approach to terror sentencing and by 
leaving the role of rehabilitation to the discretion of trial judges, the 
Supreme Court impliedly rejected the more restrictive principle in Martin 
to the effect that at least in more serious cases, rehabilitation should play 
a minimal role. In contrast to both the Court of Appeal’s approach and 
the Martin approach, the Supreme Court preserved the possibility that 
rehabilitation could be an important consideration in any terrorism case.
Before going further, it may help to identify more clearly the difference 
of opinion on this point between the Supreme Court and the Court of 
Appeal. For the lower court, terrorism was a special kind of crime that 
called for an emphasis on denunciation and deterrence in order to thwart 
the menace of terrorism swiftly and effectively. What this means, in effect, 
is that the only way we can “send a clear and unmistakable message”96 is by 
showing that we are absolutely intolerant of such conduct (and imposing 
a severe sentence); thus, we cannot adequately deter and rehabilitate at the 
same time.97 In contrast, the Supreme Court has held that if a trial judge 
95.  Ibid at para 124 [emphasis added]
96.  Khawaja (Ont CA), supra note 7 at para 246. 
97.  See ibid at 247: 
Our sentencing and correctional philosophy also places a premium on the notion 
of individual dignity and it accepts redemption and rehabilitation as desired and 
achievable goals. Regrettably, the hallmarks that define our justice system may be 
seen by those who reject democracy and individual freedom as signs of weakness. 
Terrorists, in particular, may view Canada as an attractive place from which to 
pursue their heinous activities. And it is up to the courts to shut the door on that 
way of thinking, swiftly and surely. 
is satisfied on the evidence that there are good prospects of rehabilitation, 
he or she should be free to accord significant weight to rehabilitation. 
If this inhibits us from sending as strong a message as we might have, 
then we favour some rehabilitation over a greater emphasis on deterrence. 
Put otherwise, for the Court of Appeal, deterrence required severity 
and little discussion of redemption; for the Supreme Court, concerns 
about deterrence could be adequately addressed while still fostering 
rehabilitation.
What the Supreme Court contemplated here is nuanced. It was not 
proposing that sentences in more serious cases be much shorter. The Court 
was clear that denunciation and deterrence are “important principles in the 
sentencing of terrorism offences, given their seriousness”.98 A trial judge 
might still err by failing to accord sufficient weight to these principles, or 
by placing inordinate weight on rehabilitation in a serious terrorism case. 
In more serious cases where rehabilitation is correctly given significant 
weight, the Court appears to contemplate the imposition of substantial 
but slightly lower custodial sentences than might otherwise have been 
imposed, or earlier parole eligibility, or both. 
What is difficult to discern from the passage in McLachlin CJC’s 
judgment quoted above, or from the judgment as a whole, however, is 
why the Court chose to affirm the potential validity of rehabilitation as a 
sentencing principle in any terrorism case rather than only in less serious 
ones. It is also not clear why the Court resisted the inclination to approach 
terror offences as a special category of crime, or why it appeared to favour a 
balancing of rehabilitation with deterrence, rather than concluding (as the 
Court of Appeal and other courts had done) that sending a strong deterrent 
message necessarily entails a significant minimization of rehabilitation. 
The Chief Justice’s explanation—that terrorism entails a “wide variety 
of conduct”99—does not make the rationale clear. In cases involving less 
serious conduct, rehabilitation might be easily balanced with concerns 
about denunciation and deterrence, but in more serious cases there would 
seem to be a greater tension between them. A value judgment was being 
made here: by preserving a possible role for rehabilitation in more serious 
cases, the Supreme Court was affirming the importance of rehabilitative 
justice where other courts had assumed deterrence and denunciation to be 
98.  Khawaja (SCC), supra note 3 at para 130.
99.  Ibid at para 124. 
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central, if not exclusive, concerns. The underlying rationale for this value 
judgment is a question addressed in part III.
To lend a clear sense of the Supreme Court’s break with the reasoning 
of the Court of Appeal in Khawaja, it may be worth briefly canvassing 
the Supreme Court’s response to the third error at issue: the trial judge’s 
treatment of the totality principle. The Court of Appeal sought to correct 
Rutherford J’s view of a potential conflict between the directives in 
section 83.26 of the Criminal Code—to impose consecutive sentences for 
multiple counts of terrorism offences and an upper limit of the totality 
principle at common law, in the range of 15 to 20 years. As noted earlier, 
the Court of Appeal had made clear that Rutherford J’s notion of a fixed 
upper range was based on an erroneous reading of R v M(CA),100 which 
identified a customary upper range but allowed for longer sentences that 
would not offend the totality principle. However, the Court of Appeal’s 
conclusion to that discussion was to assert—once again, categorically—
that in sentencing terrorism offenders, “the customary upper range [of 15 
to 20 years] for consecutive fixed-term sentences will not be applicable”.101 
The Court of Appeal had arrived at that conclusion after trying to 
discern why Parliament had chosen to include section 83.26—and it is 
precisely that court’s interpretation of Parliament’s intent that McLachlin 
CJ sought to reject. The Court of Appeal had held:
In our view, s. 83.26 reflects Parliament’s intention that the general principle of totality 
must be moderated or altered in the case of terrorism-related crimes. This provision signals 
that, when offenders are convicted of a number of such crimes, total sentences will be 
higher than they otherwise would be, and the customary upper range for consecutive fixed-
term sentences will not be applicable.102
And further on: “[W]e believe that in enacting [s. 83.26], Parliament 
intended to send a message that terrorism is a crime that warrants special 
consideration and it is to be treated differently for sentencing purposes.”103 
 For McLachlin CJ, section 83.26 did not signal an intention to 
alter the application of the totality principle. In her view, the Court of 
Appeal’s reading of Parliament’s intent was premised on an erroneous 
100.  Supra note 39 at para 92.
101.  Khawaja (Ont Ca), supra note 7, at para 210.
102.  Ibid.
103.  Ibid at para 218.
interpretation of that principle. What the principle requires, she said, 
is not a specific temporal limit, but only that “the sentence not exceed 
the overall culpability of the offender”.104 Thus, it is not the case that 
sentences for terror offences should, as a matter of course, depart from the 
customary limits set out in R v M(CA). Sentences beyond the twenty-year 
range “may be imposed more often in terrorism cases”, she suggested, 
but this “merely attests to the particular gravity of terrorist offences 
and the moral culpability of those who commit them.”105 The grounds 
for upholding the application of the totality principle in Khawaja were 
thus limited to the evidence in that case: “[T]he heightened gravity of the 
terrorism offences at issue in this case was sufficient to justify imposition 
of consecutive sentences running over 20 years, without violating the 
totality principle”.106 Beyond this point, significantly, McLachlin CJ did 
not seek to venture.
The Chief Justice concluded her analysis of the sentencing appeal by 
addressing the Court of Appeal’s finding of errors in the trial judge’s 
“overall approach”.107 The Court of Appeal was correct, she said, in 
holding that the trial decision failed to reflect the gravity of the appellant’s 
actions, along with the continuing danger that “this committed and 
apparently remorseless man would pose to society on release”.108 But on 
this final point, McLachlin CJ took a further opportunity to emphasize 
a broader difference in principle between her approach and that of the 
Court of Appeal. After quoting the Court of Appeal’s assertion that 
the initial sentence had failed to send a “clear and unmistakable message 
that terrorism is reprehensible and those who choose to engage in it [in 
Canada] will pay a very heavy price”, 109 the Chief Justice offered a more 
equivocal affirmation. “Without suggesting that terrorism offences attract 
special sentencing rules or goals,” she said, “I agree that denunciation and 
deterrence, both specific and general, are important principles in the 
sentencing of terrorism offences, given their seriousness”.110 Important 
principles, but neither exclusive nor even primary.
104.  Khawaja (SCC), supra note 3 at para 126.
105.  Ibid.
106.  Ibid.
107.  Khawaja (Ont CA), supra note 7 at para 192. 
108.  Khawaja (SCC), supra note 3 at para 129.
109.  Khawaja (Ont CA), supra note 7 at para 246.
110.  Khawaja (SCC), supra note 3 at para 130.
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III. A Duffian Reading of Khawaja and Its 
Broader Implications
By refusing to treat terrorism as a special category of crime, the 
Supreme Court sought to cast the terrorism offender as in some sense an 
ordinary subject of the criminal law. Contrary to earlier jurisprudence, 
offenders in very serious cases may now ask a court on sentencing to 
give serious consideration to the sympathetic principles and objectives in 
sections 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code, including rehabilitation and 
reintegration. The Court has thus rendered the sentencing of terrorism 
offenders less of an “abnormal” exercise by the standards of the criminal 
law, and potentially more compatible with the principle of rehabilitation 
found elsewhere in our sentencing framework.
However, to arrive at the position that every terrorism offender 
is entitled (at least in theory) to have sentencing courts give serious 
consideration to rehabilitation, the Court had to implicitly confront a 
question that punishment theorist Antony Duff has grappled with in the 
course of developing a general theory of punishment.111 The question, 
as Duff has posed it, is whether there are certain kinds of offences that 
render rehabilitation as a sentencing goal fundamentally inappropriate or 
implausible. One response on which both Duff and the Supreme Court 
in Khawaja appear to agree is that even grave acts of domestic terror are 
not among those offences. Yet, once again, the Court’s rationale for this 
conclusion is unclear. 
In what follows, the register of the analysis in this article shifts to 
explore theoretical justifications for the unique position the Supreme 
Court sets out in Khawaja. It draws for this purpose on Duff’s work in 
light of his notable attempts to address the particular problem posed by the 
terrorism offender to liberal states that seek to maintain the importance 
of rehabilitation in criminal justice. This article does not suggest that 
Duff’s theory actually underlies the Court’s holding, but only that it 
offers one way of understanding how that holding might be theoretically 
supported. By drawing on Duff’s work, this article also seeks to advance 
the broader argument that Khawaja marks an important affirmation by 
111.  Duff, “Penance”, supra note 13; “Terrorism”, supra note 13; and “Punishment”, supra 
note 13.
the Court of a liberal conception of political community. As explained 
below, the Court’s insistence on the possible relevance of the principle 
of rehabilitation in all terrorism cases reflects a commitment to an idea 
of the state in which the concepts of moral agency and equality, and the 
possibility of individual redemption, are central. 
Turning, then, to Duff, it might help to begin by briefly situating his 
arguments on the role of rehabilitation in terrorism sentencing within 
his larger theory of punishment. In an ideal sense, Duff contends, the 
practice of punishment can be made consistent with the liberal values 
of a community by serving as a form of communication between an 
offender and the community. A sentence should thus “communicate to 
the offender the censure that his crime deserves”112 while fostering an 
experience of “penance” and “atonement” on the offender’s part, so as to 
effect a form of moral reparation with the community. These ends can 
be accomplished through means of punishment that engage the offender 
in “burdensome” experiences and tasks, ranging from community work 
service to time in custody.113 Such experiences “focus [the offender’s] 
attention on [the] crime and its implications . . . and can thus help to 
induce or to strengthen a repentant understanding of the crime as a wrong 
against [the] community”.114 They also serve as a “forceful apology to 
those he has wronged”, and thus “reconcile him with the community”.115 
Duff concludes that “a state that is to show its citizens the respect due to 
them as responsible moral agents must address them in the kind of moral 
language that is central to this account of punishment”.116
Duff’s theory thus turns on a distinction he draws between 
“inclusive” and “exclusive” forms of punishment. Inclusive punishments 
reflect a need to take account of an individual’s capacity not only for 
wrongdoing, but also for atonement and repair.117 By contrast, exclusive 
forms of punishment entail sanctions that are merely intended to deter 
or incapacitate—e.g., a life sentence without parole or the death penalty. 
These, in effect, “cease to respect or address [offenders] as moral agents” 
by expecting citizens to be deterred from wrongdoing by the threat of 
112.  Duff, “Penance”, supra note 13 at 300.
113.  Ibid. 
114.  Ibid.
115.  Ibid at 301.
116.  Ibid at 303.
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sanctions;118 and then, if a crime is nonetheless committed, by abandoning 
rather than seeking to repair the bond that links the offender to the 
community—in essence, treating citizens as mere subjects of power.119 
Duff argues that inclusive forms of punishment are “what we are owed—
as citizens who can do wrong, and whose public wrongdoings should 
be censured, but who can also repair those wrongs by suitable kinds of 
apology and moral reparation”.120 Inclusive punishments recognize us as 
moral agents and give us a means “through which the bonds of political 
community are to be repaired and strengthened”.121
Yet Duff is also alive to the argument that in certain extreme cases—
horrific crimes, careers of persistently violent criminals, and terrorism 
offences—there is a point at which the bond between offender and 
community has been irreparably damaged. Beyond this point “we need 
not, or should not, or cannot continue to treat the offender as a full 
member of the normative political community”.122 In response to that 
argument, Duff writes:
I am fairly confident that . . . no single deed, however terrible, should put a person beyond 
civic redemption. With many horrific crimes, there might be room for serious doubt about 
the perpetrator’s status as a responsible agent: but if he is a responsible agent, we must treat 
him as such—as someone who could, and who should be given the chance to, repent his 
crime and redeem himself.123
Duff is less confident about how persistent violent offenders should be 
dealt with, but he suggests that a similar logic applies. Future victims need 
protection, yet if the community seeks to recognize each of its members 
as a moral agent, it must give even that kind of offender “the chance to 
redeem and restore himself”.124 The two concerns can be accommodated 
by imposing a “presumptively permanent detention—detention for life 
118.  Ibid at 303; see also Duff, “Punishment”, supra note 13 at 81.
119.  Duff, “Penance”, supra note 13 at 306; see also Duff, “Punishment”, supra note 13 at 
81.
120.  Duff, “Penance”, supra note 13 at 303.
121.  Ibid at 305.
122.  Ibid at 306.
123.  Ibid. 
124.  Ibid at 307. 
unless and until [the offender] shows that he can be safely restored to 
ordinary community”.125 
Terrorism, Duff’s third extreme case, is really a variation of his first: 
the horrific single criminal act. Where a citizen is involved in a serious plot 
or attack, Duff contends that the community is still obliged to recognize 
the offender’s moral agency, along with his or her membership in the 
community itself. Yet Duff distinguishes between forms of terrorism 
depending on the nature and scale of the attack: “we might plausibly feel 
that especially with the more serious kinds of international (as distinct 
from domestic) terrorism, we are faced by something that is more like 
war than crime”.126 In these cases, the laws of war should prevail. We 
may detain a person involved in such an attack without trial and for the 
duration of hostilities, but the purpose is simply to incapacitate and not 
to punish.127
Duff is reluctant to offer a means of distinguishing between attacks 
that are crimes and those that are acts of war. Contemporary terrorism, 
he suggests, has rendered the distinction untenable.128 In any event, he 
argues: 
[W]e should be slow and reluctant, especially in the case of domestic terrorism, to abandon 
the constraints and protections of the criminal law and the criminal process in favor of 
the much weaker constraints of war—to turn the terrorist from a citizen into an enemy.129
125.  Ibid. For a discussion of dangerous offenders, see also Duff, “Punishment”, supra 
note 13 at 170.
126.  Duff, “Terrorism”, supra note 13 at 759.
127.  Ibid at 760–61. This is not to say that for Duff all forms of detention under the 
laws of war are for the purpose of incapacitation. A person might be detained following a 
sentence for war crimes, in which case the primary objective would be punishment rather 
than incapacitation. Duff’s larger point, however, is that in both cases, a recognition of the 
subject’s humanity should “[limit] what we may do to them”. Ibid at 760.
128.  See Duff, “Responsibilitiy”, supra note 13: 
[I]t could be argued that the phenomena of modern terrorism require us to rethink 
our existing categories: neither the framework of ‘normal’ criminal law, nor that 
of warfare as classically conceived, can accommodate modern terrorism; we must 
either articulate a new normative category, or develop our existing categories.
Ibid at 147.
129.  Duff, “Terrorism”, supra note 13 at 760.
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Duff offers a number of reasons for this,130 although in Canada the choice 
of how to treat a citizen suspected of involvement in terrorism would 
largely be dictated by constitutional and criminal laws on detention 
and due process. The larger point is that in a manner analogous to 
the Supreme Court’s holding in Khawaja, Duff opposes any approach 
to terrorism offenders (or suspects) that would render them somehow 
abnormal—as enemies to be dealt with outside of the criminal law, rather 
than as ordinary subjects of that law. And like the Supreme Court in 
Khawaja, Duff insists that in principle, the terrorism offender should 
not be considered beyond rehabilitation or reintegration. Thus, Duffian 
logic is arguably at play in Khawaja: by seeking to preserve the possibility 
of rehabilitation in all terrorism cases, the Court seeks to maintain the 
recognition of each offender’s moral agency or capacity for change and 
reintegration. 
This raises a more crucial question in extreme cases: why should a 
community place a greater value on this form of recognition than it might 
place on denunciation and deterrence? Put otherwise, even if we assume—
contrary to the view of the Court of Appeal and other courts mentioned 
above—that we can strongly denounce and deter terrorists while also 
seeking to foster their rehabilitation, why should we bother and do the 
latter? Why should we not claim the additional security and comfort that 
a lengthy incapacitation of such offenders would give us?
Duff’s argument in favour of a concern for rehabilitation in this 
context rests on the claim that a community that is committed to 
upholding the value of individual dignity and equality must strive to 
recognize every member’s moral agency regardless of their conduct. And, 
for reasons canvased above, this in turn entails a commitment to inclusive, 
rehabilitative forms of sentencing rather than to exclusive forms alone. 
His defence of this position is based on two closely related arguments. 
The first argument rests on the premise that membership in a 
political community is best understood not as a form of contract that the 
community or a member can easily rescind, but as a more deeply rooted 
and largely involuntary relationship.131 A person’s status as a member is 
not contingent on his or her affirmation of the community’s values, but 
should be assumed as an axiomatic or existential fact. On this view, an 
130.  Duff, “Responsibility”, supra note 13 at 147.
131.  Duff, “Penance”, supra note 13 at 302.
offender does not forfeit the right to belong when he or she does wrong, 
but triggers an obligation to repair the bond with the community—even 
if the offender lacks the inclination to do so. The community in turn 
respects its members as responsible agents by committing to give each of 
them the opportunity to effect some form of reparation regardless of their 
crime and regardless of whether they are likely to atone. The analysis is 
no different for the terrorism offender; as Duff’s contends, “it is open to 
us to insist that the terrorist is a citizen who is both bound and protected 
by the values of the polity”.132 In short, maintaining a commitment to 
the redemptive potential of every offender strengthens the bond between 
members of the community.
The second argument flows from the first. For Duff, imposing an 
exclusionary form of punishment in serious cases (life without parole) 
would be tantamount to a refusal to continue recognizing the offender’s 
moral agency and capacity for redemption. To recognize these qualities 
in some cases and not others, depending on the offence at issue, would 
render the recognition of moral agency conditional on good behavior or 
on an affirmation of the community’s values. Yet, for Duff, in a liberal 
and humane community such recognition should not be conditional or 
premised on some form of contract, but should be based on the very 
fact of being human.133 One might object to this argument by claiming 
that a community can continue to recognize an offender’s humanity 
by treating him or her humanely while still imposing an exclusionary 
form of punishment such as life imprisonment. However, Duff’s larger 
point seems to be that while an exclusionary but humane sentence might 
recognize some part of the offender’s humanity, it would not recognize 
his moral agency, dignity, or equality—in other words, his humanity in 
a more robust sense. This can only be done through inclusive forms 
of punishment, the essential features of which are the prospect of 
rehabilitation and reparation of the bond with the community. Thus, 
to choose incapacitation or deterrence to the exclusion of rehabilitation 
132.  Duff, “Terrorism”, supra note 13 at 759. See also Duff, “Punishment”, supra note 13. 
“We could see those who commit [very] serious crimes as having forfeited their standing 
as citizens, but we should not do so. We should instead still see them as fellow citizens to 
whom we owe it not to allow their crimes to destroy the bonds of community, and it is 
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in some contexts and not others would amount to a kind of selective 
recognition of the humanity of each individual.
Duff’s arguments might therefore be read as a broader justification for 
the Supreme Court’s position in Khawaja, although there are important 
differences. In keeping with Duff’s theory, the Court affirmed that there 
is a potential role for rehabilitation in all terrorism cases, and thereby 
showed an unconditional commitment to recognizing the moral agency 
of all offenders. By doing so, the Court does something more than affirm 
the rehabilitative mandate of Canadian criminal law, or the need to be 
consistent and equitable in applying that mandate. In ways that Duff’s 
theory helps to discern, the Court also affirms a larger liberal conception 
of political community which values every member’s moral agency, 
equality and potential for redemption.
Yet the Court’s approach in Khawaja appears to differ from Duff’s 
in one notable respect. To be more consistent with the thrust of Duff’s 
theory of punishment, the Court might have held that in every case where 
there is a reasonable prospect of rehabilitation, trial judges must place at 
least some weight on realizing that prospect. In saying that “the weight 
to be given to rehabilitation in a given case is best left to the reasoned 
discretion of trial judges on a case-by-case basis”,134 the Court left open 
the possibility that a trial judge might reasonably hold (as the Court of 
Appeal did) that the demands of denunciation and deterrence can only be 
met by placing a greater emphasis on those principles, at the expense of 
rehabilitation. However, the Court may not have done this due in part 
to the fact that our system is already fundamentally structured such that 
almost all sentences are inclusive in the Duffian sense. In other words, 
we have neither the death penalty nor, with one exception, life without 
the possibility of parole.135 Thus, aside from that exception, every life 
sentence or indeterminate sentence is in Duffian terms only presumptively 
exclusionary. In this sense, our system already entails a commitment 
to every offender’s moral agency and capacity for redemption, and 
the Supreme Court in Khawaja simply sought to resist the Court of 
134.  Khawaja (SCC), supra note 3.
135.  The recent addition of section 745.51(1) of the Criminal Code provides for the 
possibility of life without parole by allowing for consecutive twenty-five-year parole 
ineligibility periods when sentencing for multiple murders. However, the decision to 
impose consecutive non-parole periods under this section is discretionary.
Appeal’s departure in spirit from the rehabilitative character of the larger 
framework.
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to articulate the nature of the break 
marked by the Supreme Court’s decision in Khawaja from earlier appellate 
approaches to sentencing in terrorism cases, and to explore the principled 
reasons for that break. Earlier approaches had tended to minimize the 
role of rehabilitation anywhere on the spectrum of terrorism cases, 
and to preclude virtually any role for it in the more serious cases. The 
Supreme Court in Khawaja held instead that no categorical rules about 
rehabilitation should apply to terror sentencing, implying that even in 
more serious cases, it might continue to play an important role. Yet the 
Court offered only a partial justification for this position. A reading of 
Khawaja in the light of Antony Duff’s work in this area suggests that the 
Court’s commitment to rehabilitation in more serious cases is premised 
on the view that regardless of the offence at issue, both the courts and the 
community should strive to recognize the moral agency and capacity for 
reparation of each of its members. As Duff argues, such recognition flows 
from an idea of community in which concepts of moral agency, equality 
and redemption are central.
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